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Even casual readers of Kierkegaard are aware of difficulties 
peculiar to his work: the use of personas under various 
pseudonyms; the range of genres used in aid of reflection; the 
complex interplay of philosophy, theology, and biography in 
the Danish thinker’s ouevre. For all these difficulties, 
however, there remains an organic unity in the thought of 
Kierkegaard, insofar as his body of work can be read as the 
years-long durcharbeiten (working through) of the question of 
authentic selfhood vis-à-vis the relation to the Absolute (and 
by extension, to one’s neighbor). 
Sheridan Hough’s Kierkegaard’s Dancing Tax Collector: Faith, 
Finitude, and Silence is a succinct discussion of this particular 
question, inspired by the figure described by Johannes de 
Silentio in Fear and Trembling. The epigraphs by which Hough 
introduces the book already contain Kierkegaard’s point: 
How do the words of James 1:17-21 (“Every good and 
perfect gift is from above . . .”) describe the disposition of the 
knight of faith? Hough displays a comfortable familiarity with  
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the work of Kierkegaard, and is able to draw upon various  
texts in order to achieve an “existential-phenomenological” 
and “comprehensive” reading. One could say that Hough is 
familiar enough with the steps of Kierkegaard’s thought that 
she is able to weave them into a dance routine. As Hough 
notes, her work is “not a ‘post-modern’ hop through  
various spheres of existence, but a cumulative investigation of 
what the life of faith promises’’ (p. x). In Fear and Trembling, 
the figure of the tax collector is described as someone who 
“enjoys and takes part in everything, and whenever one sees 
him participating in something particular, it is carried out with 
a persistence that characterizes the worldly person whose 
heart is attached to such things . . . everything engages him with a 
composure in existence as if he were a girl of sixteen . . .” (p. 8). In 
stark contrast to Abraham, the knight of faith whose few 
words do little to elucidate the magnitude of his sacrifice, the 
tax collector represents another way to be a knight of faith.  
As Hough follows the steps of Kierkegaard’s tax collector, 
she comes to an acknowledgment that “faith is ineluctable, 
opaque, and realized at every moment by a way of being in 
the world” (p. 6). It is no accident that this turn of phrase 
echoes Heidegger, inasmuch as Heidegger was inspired by 
Kierkegaard’s project. Faith’s manner of being in the world, 
however, is not to be confused with Heidegger’s notion. 
Perhaps Kierkegaard would see in Heidegger something of 
Hegel, against whom Kierkegaard railed. Rather than a  
 




Weltgeist or even Sein, the locus of existence for Kierkegaard is 
the self. Hough elaborates: “Human beings are born, but selves 
are created. A human being, Anti-Climacus tells us, is a 
creature of opposed dimensions, a ‘synthesis’ of infinity’s 
endless reach and finitude’s sink full of dishes . . . . Every 
human must negotiate this divide, for every person is 
located in an utterly specific historical, economic, cultural, 
and indeed bodily circumstance, all of which alters (or 
becomes more intransigent) over time” (p. 23). Furthermore: 
“This constitutional human tension, the opposition between a 
person’s finite circumstance and the infinite possibilities for 
transformation, is everyone’s birthright; a self, Anti-Climacus 
claims, is only established when a person ‘takes a stand’ on 
this existential opposition” (p. 24). Ultimately, a person “takes 
a stand” in relation to and with the Absolute.  
For Hough, Kierkegaard’s tax collector possesses what she 
calls an “epistemic flexibility,” which allows the tax collector 
to recognize that “every good and perfect gift is from above.” 
The relation with the Absolute allows for the transformation 
of human experience, even experience that might be 
understood as negative, into “good and perfect gifts from 
above.” As Hough writes, “the ‘flexibility’ that characterizes 
faith paradoxically understands the fixed, limited, and finite 
conditions of a person’s life to be infinitely flowing with 
possibilities for grace and goodness” (p.29). 
The “epistemic flexibility” that characterizes the tax 
collector allows this figure of faith to embrace all the spheres 




of human existence as conceived by Kierkegaard. Hough uses 
the next two “movements” to elaborate on the possibilities 
and limits of the aesthetic and ethical spheres. As Hough 
notes: “Our tax collector dwells in faith, meaning that he 
resolves the native synthetic tension of being human by living 
out the life-task that is uniquely his. There are, however, other 
(and ultimately unsatisfactory) ways of resolving the 
competing demands of being human: here is where the 
journey to selfhood—and to faith—begins” (p. 39). Hough 
makes use of other Kierkegaardian personae: Johannes the 
Seducer, in order to demonstrate the failure and frustration 
that attend pleasure; Judge William, who develops the ethical 
sphere by appealing to the radical efficacy of choice. Johannes 
the Seducer discovers that “the aesthete operates at the mercy 
of the ‘external condition’: beauty fades, faculties wither, 
fortunes disappear, and the call of desire creates a trail of 
satiation and depletion” (p. 69). Judge William extols the 
formative character of choice; in contrast to the Seducer’s 
fleeting affairs, the judge upholds marriage as an exemplary 
choice. For Judge William, “marriage becomes the ideal 
mechanism for repairing the constitutional tension between 
freedom and necessity: life’s ordinary, daily chores are now 
suffused with the significance of the absolute resolution to 
share that life with another person” (p.70). Marriage, defined 
by Judge William, reveals what Hough calls the “choice-
constituted self.” The problem here, however, is that Judge  
 




William’s account never transcends the organized definitions 
of the ethical sphere in order to confront and engage the 
absurd—which is where the Absolute dwells. 
Hough rounds out the dance with a meditation on faith 
and sin, again in the context of selfhood. Hough writes: 
“Faith is founded on a person’s unique vocation; when a 
person makes a commitment to that life-project, she must, as 
we just said, resign herself to its impossibility: then, of course, 
she simply takes up that task ‘by virtue of the absurd’, which 
turns out to be another way of saying that ‘with God all 
things are possible . . .’” (p. 94). Opposed to this, sin would 
mean that “a person turns away from their vocation, and fails 
to commit to their unique life-project” (p. 95). In order to 
become truly oneself again, and re-establish the absolute 
relation to the Absolute, it is necessary, Hough says, to 
confess. To confess means to exercise “epistemic flexibility” 
and come to an awareness of oneself in relation to God. 
“What the person ‘finds out’ in confession is something that 
was already present to her or him in the collection bag of 
repentance: but these transgressions are now admitted as part 
of the very constitution of who one is. I, as a sinner, am not 
looking on at the rubbish-heap of my failings; I am my 
failings. I am simply a sinner, clothed in my recognition of 
that sin, standing before God” (p. 104). Related once more to 
God and to oneself, the tax collector attains the joy of 
communion. “Having become whole through confession, the  
 




tax collector can draw close in existential communion . . . .  
His delight in his immediate, finite circumstances is his 
thanksgiving, a thanks only made possible by his encounter 
with God, through confession” (p.116). Hough concludes the 
text with further meditations on suffering and love.  
Hough presents a faithful rendition of themes found 
throughout Kierkegaard’s corpus, albeit presented in a novel 
fashion. The musical metaphor Hough uses is reminiscent of 
the technique called “sampling,” in which riffs and motifs are 
borrowed from different musical pieces in order to provide 
emphasis or counterpoint to the new composition. Moreover, 
Hough’s tone is conversational, which is no easy feat as she 
draws together various elements of Kierkegaard’s and situates 
them in the context of the Dane’s work, and the history of 
ideas. This latter element, however, provides one misgiving 
regarding this work. What Hough achieves is an overture, so 
to speak, of Kierkegaard’s thought, with the occasional 
sample from other composers (thinkers). This “sampling” 
sometimes feels strained, as though Kierkegaard’s work could 
not stand on its own, and needed some other thinkers to 
buttress it. The digressions into Nietzsche and Plato, in 
particular, made for awkward chords in a consistent 
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